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K i r s t e n C a m p b e l l
II. Acts of Testimony
Legal Memories: Sexual Assault, Memory, and International
Humanitarian Law
Witness A has shown the proposition to be true that [for] many
people who have been sexually assaulted and particularly violated,
the problem is not remembering; the problem is forgetting.1
[H]ere we are talking very much about witness memory, witness
testimony, no corroboration.2
I n November 1995, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia charged Anto Furundzija, a local commanderof Croatian armed forces, with serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law. These violations included torture and outrages on personal
dignity, which were committed in the course of the armed conflict in the
former Yugoslavia.3 The charges arose from the rape and sexual assault of
a Muslim woman, Witness A, by another soldier, Accused B, during her
I would like to thank Parveen Adams, David Bausor, Beverley Brown, Kate Nash, and
the Signs editorial group and anonymous reviewers for their illuminating and thoughtful
readings of earlier versions of this article.
1 The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, case no. IT-95-17/1-T, Prosecutor’s Closing State-
ment, transcript of trial proceedings, Trial Chamber II, June 22, 1998, par. 670. Further
reference to the transcripts of trial proceedings before Trial Chamber II in the case of
Prosecutor v. Furundzija will be cited as “Furundzija, transcript.”
2 Defense’s closing statement, Furundzija, transcript, June 22, 1998, par. 684.
3 The original indictment was later amended from three counts to two: Prosecutor v.
Furundzija 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999) 321. The amended indictment is appended to the judg-
ment of Trial Chamber II reported in International Legal Materials at 391. Further reference
to the reported judgment of Trial Chamber II in the case of Prosecutor v. Furundzija will
be cited in the text as “F.”
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interrogation by Furundzija in 1993. Furundzija was Accused B’s com-
manding officer.4
The Furundzija case has significant implications for the prosecution of
sexual assault against women in armed conflict. The case represents the
“first war crimes prosecution in which rape and sexual assault was the
single charge” (Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, 322). It provides the
first definition of the elements of the crime of rape in international hu-
manitarian law (F 352–56). Most importantly, the judgment of Trial
Chamber II, the Chamber of the Tribunal hearing the case, authoritatively
establishes that rape is a war crime under international humanitarian law
(F 352).5 The importance of the Furundzija case also lies in the contes-
tation of the concept of memory within the trial. This contestation re-
produced challenges to the reliability of the memory of the complainant
that are often raised in prosecutions of sexual assault in national jurisdic-
tions. Less typically, a ground of that challenge by the Defense was the
claimed psychological and neurochemical impact of posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) on the reliability of memory (F 339–41). In domestic
jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom or the United States, evidence
concerning posttraumatic stress disorder is generally introduced in tort
cases on behalf of a plaintiff or as expert evidence in criminal cases of
sexual assault on behalf of a complainant (Kelly 2000; Raitt and Zeedyk
2000). However, in this case, the Defense introduced posttraumatic stress
disorder as an argument against the complainant, contending that this
diagnosis raised the issue of unreliability of her memory. In Furundzija,
the parties contested not only the evidential value of memory but also
the concept of memory itself.
How does law constitute memory? To explore this question, I trace
the constitution of legal memory in the juridical field through a reading
of Prosecutor v. Furundzija. In my reading of this case, I trace the for-
mation of justiciable, procedural, and evidential memory. I first examine
the recognition of sexual assault as a war crime in substantive international
humanitarian law and argue that the legal recognition of such a crime is
the condition of the justiciability of memory and hence of its hearing
before a court of law. I then examine the constitution of memory in legal
4 It should be noted that Furundzija was not tried under the principle of “command
responsibility,” i.e., for failure to prevent or punish criminal acts of his subordinates. Rather,
he was tried for his individual responsibility for the crime of torture and for aiding and
abetting outrages on personal dignity, including rape. See F 329.
5 The Tribunal is comprised of three Trial Chambers and an Appeals Chamber. See
Oosthuizen 2001 for an introductory overview of the structure of the Tribunal.
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practices and contend that prosecutorial and procedural practices operate
to constitute legal memory. Third, I consider the different accounts of
memory that are deployed in Furundzija, each account understanding
legal memory in a different way. Finally, I analyze the legal construction
of memory in relationship to sexual difference. I trace the juridical con-
stitution of gendered memory in the case of Prosecutor v. Furundzija
through its formation of justiciable and procedural memory, the legal
conception of evidential memory, and its judgment on memory itself.
Justiciable memory
Shoshana Felman claims that “[e]very trial is related to an injury, a trauma
for which it compensates and that it attempts to remedy and overcome”
(1999, 36). However, a traumatic injury is not necessarily a wrong, nor
is it always justiciable. In the juridical field, not every traumatic injury is
considered to be a social wrong, and not every social wrong is considered
to be the appropriate subject of legal intervention or remedy. In order to
be heard by a court of justice, the traumatic injury must give rise to a
legal claim and so fall subject to the jurisdiction of the court. In this sense,
justiciability is a formal condition for the memory of an injury to become
subject to the law such that the court will recognize the claim of injury
as a legal memory of a formal wrong. Justiciability is thus the condition
for the recognition of the memory of a traumatic injury as a legal claim.
A justiciable wrong is a wrong recognized as such by substantive law.
For example, for rape in armed conflict to be a justiciable wrong, inter-
national humanitarian law must define it as a wrong. The substantive legal
definition of an act as a crime constitutes a social wrong as a criminal
wrong. That legal recognition of a crime is itself conditional on the social
and political recognition of a legal wrong. In this sense, the legal, the
social, and the political recognition of the wrong as a criminal act produces
the war crime of sexual assault as defined by substantive international
humanitarian law. This construction of a criminal wrong is the ground of
the Furundzija case because without the recognition of rape as a war
crime, the prosecution could not take place, and there could be no for-
mation of legal memory.
This process of the formation of justiciable memory can be traced in
the constitution of rape as a crime in substantive international humani-
tarian law. A foundational principle of international law is nullum crimen,
nulla poena sine lege: that there is no crime without law. This principle
of international law entails that without a law prohibiting an act, there
can be no crime and thus no legally recognized wrong. For example, in
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the Furundzija case, Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“the Tribunal”) establishes its juris-
diction to “prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war.”6 Trial
Chamber II, following the earlier decision in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,
held that Article 3 covers “any serious violation of a rule of customary
international humanitarian law” (F 345). It was because of the “nullum
crimen principle that the Statute of the Tribunal was limited to the cus-
tomary law (including conventional law that is ‘beyond doubt’ part of
customary law)” (Cleiren and Tijssen 1996, 268). The Statute was drafted
in this way to ensure that all states, whether signatories of international
humanitarian conventions or not, would be within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal (Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, 313). Without that jurisdic-
tion, the Tribunal cannot properly hear allegations of crimes committed
in armed conflict.
This formulation of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal raised the issue of
whether under Article 3 rape constituted a “serious violation of a rule of
customary international humanitarian law”—that is, whether this act is a
crime under international law. There has been considerable debate on this
issue in international law jurisprudence. While normative concerns frame
this debate, discussion of technical legal issues mainly governs it. These
technical issues arise because of the apparent lack of certainty and clarity
of the law in this area where “sexual violence generally has not been treated
as a distinct offence or in a uniform manner by international criminal law
and international human rights law. . . . Instead, it has been inserted,
sometimes explicitly and at other times implicitly, in many different con-
ventions and agreements. . . . As a result of this fragmentation, there are
significant gaps in protection from sexual violence, in the normative
scheme for its prohibition and in the punishment of offenders. The Tri-
bunal’s Statute reflects this compartmentalized and incomplete normative
framework” (Bassiouni 1996, 560).
While a number of commentators argue that the legal basis for the
prosecution of such crimes exists (Askin 1997), others argue that the lack
of clarity in this area leaves such prosecutions vulnerable to defeat on
technical grounds (Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000). For example, C. P.
M. Cleiren and M. E. M. Tijssen suggest that “it will be difficult for the
6 The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (1993), 31 I.L.M. (1993) 1203 (“the
Statute”).
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prosecution to prove that a specific offense falls under one or more of
the articles that set out the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal”
(1996, 289). Indeed, in Furundzija, as in other cases before the Tribunal,
the Defense used technical arguments concerning justiciability to argue
that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to try the charges of sexual
assault (F 330).
Importantly, the judgment in this case clarifies the status of sexual
assault as a “serious violation of a rule of customary international hu-
manitarian law” (which was also confirmed on appeal). First, the Trial
Chamber held that in specific circumstances, rape falls within the definition
of torture under customary international humanitarian law. Second, it held
that “under international criminal law, rape may acquire the status of a
crime distinct from torture” (F 352). In particular, rape is contrary to
customary international law, constitutes a breach of international human
rights law, and “may also amount to a grave breach of the Geneva con-
ventions, a violation of the laws or customs of war or an act of genocide”
(F 353). Prosecutor v. Furundzija thus affirms the principle that rape in
armed conflict is a crime contrary to international humanitarian law and
therefore a legal wrong that is recognized in its substantive law.
In doing so, the Tribunal recognizes sexual assault as a war crime
that is contrary to established norms of international law. That recog-
nition of sexual assault as a war crime is a recognition of a change in
international norms. Kelly Askin argues that “[h]istorically, preventing,
punishing or even acknowledging these crimes against women have been
regarded as neither imperative nor important by the military and inter-
national communities” (1997, 377). The legal recognition of a crime is
itself contingent on the political and social definition of the wrong as a
legal wrong. The issue of whether the formulation of that legal wrong
is politically or pragmatically adequate is a different and further question
(see Nikolivic-Ristanovic 2000). However, a legal wrong does not exist
without prior social or political recognition. Justiciability of the wrong
is conditional on its legal recognition, which is in turn contingent on
its social and political recognition.
The legal recognition of this crime is due in part to the changing social
context of international law. This changing social context includes a num-
ber of international conventions regarding the status and rights of women,
such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW; 1979). In 1993, the CEDAW committee
played a key role in raising the issue of the situation of women in the
former Yugoslavia with the United Nations Commission on Human
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Rights (Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000, 221).7 This is not to claim that
international instruments, institutions, or substantive law in their current
form can or do adequately address gendered harms, because clearly they
do not (Askin 1997, 259–60). However, gender has become an important
issue on the international agenda, which has increasingly recognized “gen-
der discrimination as a violation of customary international law” (Askin
1997, 231). This social recognition of the rights of women—including
the “right to physical integrity”—has been a key element in the legal
recognition of rape as a war crime (F 353).
The changing social context of international law is also a changing
political context, in which the international community has increasingly
accepted political arguments that sexual assault should be recognized as a
war crime. Cleiren and Tijssen contend that “the social conditions behind
the evolution of international law in the latter part of this century have
been generated in large part by the emergence of feminism and by the
growing awareness among physicians, psychiatrists, and psychologists that
sexual assault is a very serious crime of violence of a sexual nature, which
causes a wide range of harmful effects” (1996, 265). This changing po-
litical context includes international and domestic feminist communities
working in the media, in universities, in nongovernmental organizations,
and in the United Nations, all of whom have contributed to the formal
legal recognition of sexual assault as an international crime of armed con-
flict.8 In relation to the Tribunal, the women of the former Yugoslavia
have been central to this process of change. Again, this argument does
not claim that those groups are without conflict or that the international
community has adequately responded to women’s concerns (see Nikolivic-
Ristanovic 2000). However, it is necessary to acknowledge the political
engagements that have enabled the recognition of rape as a war crime,
including the hard fight of women and men for that recognition. These
changing social and political conceptions of gendered harms have been a
crucial ground of the recognition of sexual assault in armed conflict as a
justiciable wrong.
7 Charlesworth and Chinkin critically note the weakness of the monitoring provisions
under CEDAW, which is ultimately the reason that the CEDAW committee had to notify
the Commission on Human Rights to ensure appropriate reporting and observance action
(2000, 221).
8 Human rights activists and organizations and international lawyers and scholars also
played crucial roles in this shift in political context (see Askin 1997, 300–301). There was,
of course, a broader and complex political context for the establishment of the Tribunal (see
Forsythe 1996). Part of this political context was memory, namely, the memory of the
Holocaust.
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In Furundzija, the judicial affirmation that sexual assault in armed
conflict is an international crime constitutes it as a wrong that the inter-
national community recognizes. That legal affirmation recognizes that the
traumatic injury is a social wrong. It is an act of collective recognition, a
collective memory of a wrong. It acknowledges that the traumatic injury
is not a private wrong since it is a violation “of universally accepted norms
of international law” (F 352). In this way, the judgment in Furundzija
affirms that rape in armed conflict is a public wrong. That legal affirmation
permits the private memory of the individual’s injury to become a public
memory of a public wrong. In this sense, it functions as the condition of
possibility of a legal memory of the wrong. Laurence Kirmayer argues
that “[t]here is a crucial distinction between the social space in which the
trauma occurred and the contemporary space in which it is (or is not)
recalled. . . . If a community agrees traumatic events occurred and weaves
this fact into its identity, then collective memory survives and individual
memory can find a place[, otherwise] it vanishes from collective memory
and the possibility for individual memory is severely strained” (1996,
189–90).
The establishment of sexual assault in armed conflict as a criminal wrong
permits the constitution of the juridical field, in which the traumatic event
is recalled as a legal event. In this field, traumatic memory becomes a
justiciable memory that is subject to the justice of the courts.
Procedural memory
However, the juridical is not reducible to the formal or substantive ex-
pression of principle in legal instruments and judgments. “The law” also
consists of the mechanisms and processes of its application, that is, in legal
practices. These practices also construct the memory of an injurious event
as a legal memory. As can be seen in prosecutions of sexual assaults in
armed conflict, legal practices such as the decision to lay charges of sexual
assault, the collection of evidence by the prosecution, and the procedural
and evidentiary rules of a hearing constitute legal memory. These practices
form legal memory, both in terms of the establishment and prosecution
of a claim of a legal wrong and in terms of its hearing before the court.
Sexual assault in armed conflict has been infrequently prosecuted under
international law. Cleiren and Tijssen point out that “the history of warfare
reveals some rare examples of individuals charged with responsibility for
the crime of rape perpetrated by soldiers under their command. . . . In
general, however, international lawyers have paid scant attention to rape
and other types of sexual assault committed in armed conflict” (267). For
156 ❙ Campbell
example, rape was not specifically prosecuted as a war crime in the Nu-
remberg War Crimes Trials but was prosecuted in the Tokyo War Crimes
Trials only in conjunction with other crimes (Askin 1997, 14). This sit-
uation has been not so much a result of the lack of legal grounds for
laying such charges as a decision by prosecutors not to indict on these
grounds: “[T]he problem lies not so much in the law but in the failure
to enforce its prohibitions” (Thomas and Ralph 1999, 214). As M. Cherif
Bassiouni summarizes, feminist theorists in this area generally argue that
the reason that “rape has not been prosecuted internationally has been
that acts which primarily harm women have not been viewed by men who
make policy decisions as violations of those women’s human rights. Fur-
thermore, that rape and sexual assault are often viewed as private aber-
rational acts, not proper subjects for an international public forum” (1996,
557–58, n. 154).
Even if there is a formal substantive wrong under international law,
unless there is a decision to prosecute that wrong, there will be no hearing
before a court of law. Under Rule 47(B) of the Rules of the Tribunal,
prosecution will proceed if “there is sufficient evidence to provide rea-
sonable grounds for believing that a suspect has committed a crime within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”9 Without a prosecution, there can be
no legal memory. Furundzija is the first case in which sexual assault in
armed conflict has been prosecuted as a single charge.
If the decision to prosecute is the first condition of the formation of
legal memory, proof of the prosecution’s case is a second condition. Under
Rule 89, the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution proves its case by gathering the material evidence of
memory, which includes documentary, testimonial, and expert evidence.
However, the court will not hear all evidence of memory, and evidence
must satisfy a number of technical rules before it is admitted to court.
The evidence must be “material” to the issues of the trial—that is, it must
be considered relevant to the issues to be heard before the court. For
example, the Rules specify that “[a] Chamber may admit any relevant
evidence which it considers to have probative value” (Rule 89). It also
must be admissible in court according to rules of evidence and procedure,
such as those set out by section 3 of the Rules of the Tribunal.
Even if evidence is relevant, probative, and admissible, the prosecution
9 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (1994) IT/34/Rev.
18 (“the Rules”).
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must be able to bring that evidence before the court, and the practical
difficulties of obtaining that evidence, including the resources and com-
mitment of the prosecuting body, the social context of the injurious event,
and its judicial hearing, may keep the prosecution from doing so. In the
case of sexual assault in armed conflict, such difficulties are greatly am-
plified. Resources are necessary to collect the prosecution’s material evi-
dence, such as interviewing potential witnesses, collecting and collating
documentary evidence, and obtaining expert evidence (see Fitzgerald
1997). More importantly, Bassiouni identifies the impact of a lack of
resources on potential and actual witnesses: “[t]o think that victims of
rape and sexual assault will risk their lives and those of their families,
during and after a trip to the Hague, open themselves to retraumatization,
and lose their privacy without effective means, both financial and personal,
for care and support is not only ridiculous but dangerous” (1996, 608).10
In recognition of the necessity of protection for victims and witnesses,
particularly in cases of rape and sexual assault, Rule 34 of the Rules of
the Tribunal provides for a Victims and Witnesses Unit that advises on
protective measures such as prevention of identification and provides
counseling and support. In Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Trial Chamber II
held that “a fair trial means not only fair treatment to the defendant but
also the Prosecution and witnesses . . . it is in the public interest for the
International Tribunal to discharge its obligation to protect victims and
witnesses.”11 Public interest arises because the testimony of the victim and
witnesses is crucial to the prosecution’s case. For the prosecution, the
witness testifies to the crime, to the existence of the legal wrong that
founds the prosecution’s case. The testimony of the witness offers the
material evidence of memory and hence proof of the crime.
In the case of sexual assault, the key figure of the witness is the com-
plainant, the person who testifies to the crime committed against her or
him. What if the complainant is unable to testify, to act as the witness of
the crime? The circumstances of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia had
10 In the Furundzija case, the Prosecutor expressed concern at the potential identification
of Witness A following the disclosure of details concerning her family members during
Defense evidence: Furundzija, transcript, November 9, 1998, par. 775. Moreover, Trial
Chamber II recognized the dangers posed to witnesses by the “lack of a fully funded and
operation witness protection programme” in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, case no. IT-94-I-T,
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Wit-
nesses, Trial Chamber II, August 10, 1995, par. 42.
11 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, case no. IT-94-I-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion
Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, Trial Chamber II, August 10,
1995, pars. 55–56.
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the effect that the witness may not wish to, or cannot, provide testimony.
Bassiouni, formerly chairman of the United Nations Commission of Ex-
perts for the investigation of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, points
out that “[o]ften, victims are unable to name the perpetrator, or they can
offer only an incomplete identification. In many other instances, victims
know the identities of their attackers, but do not disclose it for fear of
retaliation. In fact, many victims have not come forward to report the
crime for this reason and for others, such as fear of ostracization from
their communities and skepticism about UN effectiveness or NGO in-
terest” (1996, 56).12
Bassiouni raises the problem of how to prosecute when there is no
memory because the perpetrators of the crime have murdered the wit-
nesses to the crime (1996, 57). According to reports, during the war in
the former Yugoslavia, many women taken out to be raped “were never
returned and must be presumed dead” (Cockburn 1998, 185). In their
discussion of the Holocaust, Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub describe
this situation as the “event without a witness,” an event that involves not
only the “literal erasure of its witnesses” but also “the preclusion of any
community of witnessing” because of the nature of genocide (Felman
1992b, 211).
If the prosecution can establish sufficient material evidence of legal
memory, then the case can be heard before a court of law. Such a hearing
is a legal practice that is integral to the formation of legal memory. Key
examples of such trial practices are procedural and evidential rules and
their enactment in court by the prosecution, defense, and judge. These
rules and their performance determine the formation of memory within
the trial process and hence also form legal memory. The court recognizes
that process of the constitution of legal memory, which is why it has rules
of evidence and procedure that determine whose testimony comes before
the court and in what form. For example, the Rules of the Tribunal set
out evidential and procedural rules for trial proceedings. In relation to
sexual assault, the most significant of these is Rule 96:
In cases of sexual assault:
i) no corroboration of the victim’s testimony shall be required;
ii) consent shall not be allowed as a defense if the victim
12 For example, insufficient identification was the grounds for a finding of no case to
answer in relationship to rape charges: Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Raomir Kovac and
Zoran Vukovic, case no. IT-96-23-T and no. IT-96-23-1T, Decision on Motion for Acquittal,
Trial Chamber II, July 3, 2000.
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a) has been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear
violence, duress, detention, or psychological oppression or
b) reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another
might be so subjected, threatened, or put in fear;
iii) before evidence of the victim’s consent is admitted, the Accused
shall satisfy the Trial Chamber in camera that the evidence is relevant
and credible;
iv) prior sexual conduct of the victim shall not be admitted in evidence.
Kate Fitzgerald characterizes Rule 96 as an “explicit rejection of stan-
dards of evidence which have traditionally discriminated against women
in court and impeded their access to criminal justice systems domestically”
(1997, 639). Traditional standards of evidence, at the levels of both legal
doctrine and process, have been based on discriminatory notions of the
alleged inherent unreliability of the evidence of rape victims. Hilary
Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin argue that Rule 96 “is significant in
its response to many criticisms of the treatment of rape victims in national
legal systems” (2000, 324).
Despite the substantive importance of Rule 96 in attempting to alleviate
such discriminatory standards, the Furundzija case suggests that the re-
liability of the memory of rape victims is still in question in the trial
proceedings. For example, following disclosure of a psychiatric report of
Witness A, “having balanced the interests of medical confidentiality and
fairness to the accused,” the Trial Chamber decided that the medical
records of Witness A would be admitted as evidence and the trial reopened
on this issue (with the result that Witness A not only had her medical
records disclosed but also had to undergo further cross-examination).13
International feminist lawyers and academics submitted an amicus curiae
(friend of the court) brief on the issue. The brief argued that the
Chamber’s decision to allow submission of these records might have been
based on “unwitting” discriminatory notions regarding the inherent un-
reliability of rape victims.14 By allowing the admission of evidence about
the psychiatric state of Witness A, the Chamber thereby imposed a higher
standard of reliability and credibility on Witness A. In the Furundzija
13 See also Furundzija, transcript, November 9, 1998.
14 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, case no. IT-95-17/1, Amicus Curiae Brief Respecting the
Decision and Order of the Tribunal of July 16, 1998, Requesting that the Tribunal Reconsider
Its Decision Having Regard to the Rights of Witness “A” to Equality, Privacy and Security
of the Person, and to Representation by Counsel, par. 16 (“Amicus Curiae Brief”).
160 ❙ Campbell
case, then, prosecutorial processes, procedural and evidential rules, and
judicial interpretation of those rules form gendered legal memory.
Substantive law and legal practices thus form gendered legal memory.
In the Furundzija case, legal memory is gendered in two ways. First,
conceptions of gender are central to the formation of sexual assault as a
justiciable memory under international humanitarian law. Second, gender
informs the legal practices of prosecution of a justiciable memory of the
wrong and its hearing before a court of law. This gendered formation of
legal memory is in turn grounded on legal notions of memory as evidence.
Evidential memory
In the Furundzija trial, the evidence of memory was a central and con-
tentious issue. Particularly in dispute was Witness A’s memory of the
wrong. While there was no question that assaults on Witness A had oc-
curred, the Defense brought into question the accuracy of the memory
of Witness A regarding the role of the accused in those assaults. The
Defense alleged that the Prosecution had provided inadequate identifi-
cation of the Accused15 and insufficient evidence of his presence during
the assaults on Witness A (F 330) on the ground that Witness A’s memory
of the injurious event was unreliable.
Two key issues concerning memory were raised during the course of
the trial: first, as noted above, the issue of the admission of records of
psychological and medical treatment of Witness A and second, the possible
diagnosis, and implications, of posttraumatic stress disorder of Witness A.
The Prosecutor in his submission to the Appeals Chamber describes the
relationship between these two issues: “any evidence relating to the mental
health or psychological state of Witness A generally would have been
material to his [the Appellant’s] case since his defence had been conducted
on the basis that Witness A’s memory was flawed.”16 The nexus between
these two issues was the Defense’s argument that the memory of the
witness was unreliable.
The first issue concerned the admission of medical and psychological
reports of treatment and diagnosis of Witness A. The Medica Women’s
Therapy Centre, an organization specifically set up to treat female survivors
of the Yugoslavian conflict (Cockburn 1998, 174–85), had written a con-
15 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, case no. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment of July 21, 2000, Appeals
Chamber, par. 103.
16 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, case no. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment of July 21, 2000, Appeals
Chamber, par. 56.
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temporaneous medical report concerning Witness A’s treatment. Medica’s
report concerned the diagnosis of Witness A with posttraumatic stress
disorder arising from her experiences in the conflict and her subsequent
treatment. The Trial Chamber accepted the argument of the Defense
regarding the relevance of these documents and permitted a reopening
of the trial on the issue of the “medical, psychological or psychiatric treat-
ment or counselling received by Witness A” (F 338). The Defense argued
that this issue was relevant to the question of the reliability of the memory
of the witness, which became a central issue of the trial. As the Appeals
Chamber noted, Trial Chamber II decided to admit these medical records
because they “clearly had the potential to affect the credibility of the pros-
ecution evidence.”17
The relevance of the Medica report did not concern a new disclosure
of PTSD. Rather, the Defense had already offered expert evidence as to
the diagnosis of Witness A as suffering from PTSD and its implications
regarding the alleged unreliability of her evidence. Prior to the disclosure
of the Medica report, the Defense had argued that Witness A’s identifi-
cation of the Defendant and recall of events was unreliable on the grounds
that she was psychologically unstable and suggestible and that she was
influenced in her recollections by postwar politics and investigators.18 For
this reason, the admissibility of the Medica report and its diagnosis of
PTSD become a central issue in the trial. The Trial Chamber summarized
this central issue as “whether the reliability of the evidence of Witness A
has or may have been affected by any psychological disorder from which
she may have suffered as a result of her ordeal. It is thus necessary to
consider whether she was suffering from PTSD, and, if so, whether it has
or may have affected her memory” (F 339).
The Witness
Witness A rejected this argument concerning the diagnosis and its alleged
implications. As summarized by the Trial Chamber: “Witness A gave a
different account. . . . Although she was physically exhausted and had
difficulty sleeping, she did not seek psychiatric help. . . . Medica had
approached her, and she had not asked for psychological assistance. She
did not agree with the Medica report and the diagnosis of PTSD. How-
ever, she had taken tranquillisers. She maintained that she accurately re-
membered the events that form the subject of this case” (F 339). For
17 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, case no. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment of July 21, 2000, Appeals
Chamber, par. 75.
18 Furundzija, transcript, June 22, 1998, pars. 676–85.
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Witness A, her memory of the injurious event was reliable and accurate.
She did not suffer from PTSD nor had she received psychological treat-
ment. Because of the potential identification of Witness A, her testimony
on this point is redacted (or deleted) from the transcripts of the trial. Her
testimony does not appear in the trial transcripts but is re-presented by
the Trial Chamber in its judgment.19
The Defense
In its closing statement to the Trial Chamber, the Defense argued that
the memory of Witness A was unreliable for four key reasons. First, she
was in a state of psychological and physical distress; second, there was no
corroborating evidence; third, her recall of events and identification were
reconstructions for postwar political activists and investigators; and fourth,
these reconstructions were inconsistent.20 In the reopening of proceed-
ings, “the Defence case was that because Witness A was suffering from
PTSD and may have been treated for it, Witness A’s memory was likely
to have been affected and contaminated” (F 340).
The Defense presented two limbs to this argument: the first concerning
the diagnosis of PTSD and the second concerning the implications of that
diagnosis for reliability of evidence. Regarding the first limb, the Defense’s
expert witness claimed that Witness A’s rejection of the diagnosis and her
“denial” of the symptoms of PTSD were typical of sufferers of the disorder.
The expert witness also claimed “that his reading of the documents sug-
gested that Witness A was suffering from chronic PTSD” (F 340).
The Defense presented two different arguments concerning the im-
plications of the diagnosis of PTSD for the reliability of witness evidence,
both relying on the evidence of expert witness testimony from the United
States. The first argument was that because of her alleged PTSD, Witness
A’s memory was unreliable. It was unreliable for two reasons, one neu-
robiological and the second psychological. The neurological claim of un-
reliability relies on the contention that “high levels of stress hormones
can damage the area of the brain called the hippocampus, responsible for
memory” (F 340). The contention was that people with PTSD suffer
from hippocampus damage and accordingly from memory disorders, such
as poor and inconsistent recall of events. The expert witness went so far
as to claim that “he would not consider a single course of information
from the reported memory of one individual suffering from PTSD to be
19 Furundzija, transcript, November 9, 1998, pars. 812–68.
20 Furundzija, transcript, June 22, 1998, pars. 676–85.
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scientifically reliable and that he would want independent corroborating
evidence” (F 340).
The psychological argument about unreliability relied on claims con-
cerning the psychological sequelae of PTSD. The expert witness sup-
porting this limb of the argument contended that “the more trauma, the
worse the memory” (F 340). In other words, the higher the degree of
trauma suffered, the more unreliable the memory (F 340).21 The expert
witness claimed that this unreliability was compounded by both the in-
adequacy of treatment and the type of treatment of the trauma offered
by the Medica Women’s Therapy Centre. This treatment, he claimed,
“could have contributed to false beliefs.” He also claimed that the so-
called mixed mission of Medica of both providing treatment for trauma
patients and of campaigning for the prosecution of war criminals “may
be incompatible with the recovery and treatment of trauma patients.”22
The Prosecution
The Prosecution did not argue against the diagnosis of Witness A as a
PTSD sufferer. Rather, its case rested on the veracity of the witness and
corroborating evidence (F 340–41). The Prosecution presented two ar-
guments on the question of reliability. The first concerned the credibility
of the witness. The Prosecution contended “that any arguments that Wit-
ness A’s credibility was diminished due to therapeutic interference with
her memory or because of biological damage to her brain were pure
speculation” since expert witnesses had pointed out that there was no
evidence for either claim in relation to Witness A (F 340). The second
Prosecution argument addressed the claims of PTSD and unreliability of
memory. The Prosecution, again relying on expert evidence, argued that
“PTSD does not render a person’s memory of traumatic events unworthy
of belief. [Rather,] intense experiences such as the events in this case
are often remembered accurately despite some inconsistencies” (F 340).
Moreover, “inconsistency does not necessarily mean inaccuracy” (F 340).
The Tribunal
The Trial Chamber accepted “the diagnosis that it is likely that Witness
A had PTSD” on the rather inadequate basis of the Medica report, made
21 In the transcript of the trial proceedings, the expert witness makes this claim specifically
in relation to victims of rape: Furundzija, transcript, November 9, 1998, pars. 895–96.
22 The implication is made clearer in the transcript of the trial proceedings, namely, that
Medica’s aim of campaigning for international war crimes courts to prosecute war criminals
was an illegitimate political goal that influenced Witness A’s (allegedly inaccurate) recollection
of events: Furundzija, transcript, November 9, 1998, pars. 893–95.
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some years before, and the evidence of expert witnesses of the Prosecution
and Defense, who had not examined Witness A (F 340). However, the
Chamber found that “Witness A’s memory regarding material aspects of
the events was not affected by any disorder she may have had” nor is
“there any evidence of any form of brain damage or that her memory was
in any way contaminated by any treatment that she may have had” (F
341). The Chamber rejected the argument that a diagnosis of PTSD
necessarily entailed that the evidence given by a witness was inaccurate
because “[t]here is no reason why a person with PTSD cannot be a per-
fectly reliable witness” (F 341).
However, by formulating its judgment in this way, the Trial Chamber
left open two key questions. The first concerns the neurological definition
of PTSD. The Chamber does not make clear whether, if evidence of brain
damage could be provided, it would be sufficient to raise the question of
unreliability in relation to the witness. Second, given that the Chamber
found that Witness A’s memory was not affected by her Medica treatment
on the grounds that it was “of a purely preliminary nature,” would evi-
dence of a “comprehensive” psychological treatment be sufficient to raise
questions of unreliability?23
Moreover, the Trial Chamber did not resolve the question of the rel-
evance of the psychological state of the witness to issues of reliability.
Indeed, given the way the Chamber’s remarks on PTSD were framed, this
question remains central to the Chamber’s findings. The Chamber insisted
that the reopening of the proceedings was predicated not on this issue
(as argued in the Amicus Curiae Brief) but rather on its “duty to uphold
the fairness and presumption of innocence.” Nevertheless, the assumption
that the psychological condition and treatment of the witness is relevant
to the issue of reliability appears to trigger the duty of the Chamber to
the Accused (F 341). The Chamber suggests that the psychological state
of the witness is relevant to reliability, but the specific diagnosis of PTSD
does not necessarily entail that the witness is unreliable.
Tropes of memory
If the evidence of memory was in dispute in the Furundzija case, that
dispute contested the concept of memory itself. It is possible to trace four
23 While the Chamber accepted that the “aim of therapy is not fact-finding,” nevertheless
that finding concerns the corroborative (or otherwise) value of statements made in the course
of therapy rather than the issue in question of the claimed unreliability of the witness due
to her psychological state (F 341).
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models of memory in Furundzija. The first model is the testimonial mem-
ory of the witness; the second, the Prosecutor’s model of memory as the
meaningful truth of the wrong; the third, the Defense’s conception of
memory as mentality; and the fourth, the evidential model of memory of
the Trial Chamber of the Tribunal. Each account understands memory
in a different way and gives it different meaning.
The court of law is often characterized as utilizing a realist model of
memory that understands it as a reproduction of “reality.” For example,
Michael Lambek describes the court as holding a “literalist view of mem-
ory . . . which neglects the fact that . . . representation can never be
identical reproduction” (1996, 242). Yet these models do not deploy a
literalist understanding of memory, in that they do not contend that it
provides an identical reproduction of an event. Moreover, they share a
concern with the evidential value of memory. However, they present a
different account of memory’s re-presentation of an event and of its value
as evidence of that event. The place of memory in law is a central issue
of contention in Furundzija. Tracing these different models of memory
reveals the legal formation of memory itself.
The Witness
Following Laub, the model of memory that a complainant presents to
the court can be described as the testimonial model. In this model, mem-
ory is a recalling of the injurious act and a testimonial to the wrong. In
the testimonial model, memory functions both as a description of the
traumatic injury and as a claim of a wrong. For example, Witness A ex-
plicitly rejects the claim that her experiences create a psychological syn-
drome or psychiatric damage. For Witness A, her memory may be trau-
matic, but it is not psychopathological. Rather, her evidence is a
testimonial to the injurious event since “the evidence she gave was the
way she, as the person who endured these events, saw them happen” (F
342). She acts as “a witness to the truth of what happens during an event”
(Laub 1992a, 80). The witness gives testimony, an act of testifying to the
truth of an event that offers “one’s own speech as material evidence for
the truth” (Felman 1992a, 5). In this sense, memory is a testimony to a
wrong, a testimonial expressing the truth of the wrong and therefore
existing in a necessary relation to it.
Giorgio Agamben argues that in Latin, “there are two words for ‘wit-
ness.’” The first, “testis, from which our word testimony derives, ety-
mologically signifies the person who, in a trial or lawsuit between two
rival parties, is in the position of a third party.” The second word, “su-
perstes, designates a person who has lived through an event from beginning
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to end and can therefore bear witness to it” (2000, 17). The complexity
of the position of the complainant as witness arises from the fact that her
memory is a testimonial to the wrong—she is a complainant. Because she
is a complainant, she is not a “neutral” third-party witness in a trial. Her
testimonial memory is a description not just of an event but also of a
wrongful event. For this reason, in the testimonial model of memory, “a
non-juridical element of truth exists, such that the quaestio facto can never
be reduced to the quaestio iuris” (2000, 17). The nonjuridical element
of truth in this model is that the complainant testifies not to a wrongful
act against another but to a wrong to her person. Unlike the testis, she
is not simply a witness to an event; rather, her testimony materializes the
wrong to her person. In this model, the fact of the event and the wrong
are not separable because her testimony to the event is also testimony to
the wrong to her. She is living proof of the wrong, which her memory
evidences. As witness, she embodies the wrong before the court.
Her testimonial memory is therefore not only a description of the act,
it is also a description of its nature as a social wrong. For this reason,
testimonial memory is more than a descriptive claim of “reality”; it is also
testimony to a social wrong. In cases of sexual assault, that wrong is the
traumatic injury to the social subject. The wrong concerns not only the
traumatic rupture of the integrity of the body (the act of assault) but also
the assault on the integrity of the “self” of the victim (Cornell 1998,
36–37; Hengehold 2000, 196–97). The testimony concerns not only a
personal wrong but also a collective wrong. Testimonial memory is in-
voked “in order to address another, to impress on a listener, to appeal to
a community” (Felman 1992b, 204). It is also an address to justice.
The Defense
A second model of memory circulates throughout the Defense’s case. This
model severs memory from any necessary relation to the event and hence
to the wrong. Rather, it is understood as a labile mental representation.
The Defense argues that memory “is actually an opinion or belief as to
what occurred.”24 Its content expresses psychological or neurobiological
states, rather than the reality of the event. This model might be called
memory as mentality, in the sense that the model understands a causal
relation between the claimed psychological or neurological “state of mind”
of the person and the content of her or his memory. As the Prosecutor
notes in its submission to the Appeals Chamber, the essence of the Defense
24 Defense’s Opening Statement, Furundzija, transcript, June 8, 1998, par. 86.
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case in Furundzija was that Witness A’s memory of her assault is flawed
because of her “mental health or psychological state.”25
The model of memory put forward by the Defense assumes that the
memory of Witness A is unreliable because she suffers from a psycho-
pathology, whether defined as a psychological state or neurological dam-
age. The Defense claims that her psychopathology results from her trau-
matic experience of rape. In this model, the rupture of bodily integrity
results in a rupture of psychic integrity and hence a rupture of the integrity
of memory. That reading of trauma implies both that she is suggestible
and therefore susceptible to a reworking of her memory by others and
that she is psychologically unstable and therefore inherently unreliable in
her recollections. In this way, the Defense’s model of memory sets up a
nexus among the experience of rape, psychopathology, and the unrelia-
bility of memory.
The Prosecution
By contrast, the Prosecution presents to the Trial Chamber a model of
memory that assumes that there is a truthful relationship between the
recollection of the complainant and the event. It does not characterize
that relationship as a reproduction of “reality” but, rather, as an accurate
account of the event. The Prosecution argued that “intense experiences
such as the events in this case are often remembered accurately despite
some inconsistencies” and that Witness A recalled the “core” events of
this experience (F 340–41). For the Prosecution, the complainant is a
testis, a third-party witness to the occurrence of the event. The veracity
of the memory of the complainant derives from her position as a witness
to the event. Her memory evidences the wrongful act, attesting to the
fact of the wrong. This model assumes that the memory of the witness
re-presents the wrongful act. It is strikingly similar to the psychoanalytic
model of memory proposed by Laub where the fallibility and incom-
pleteness of the memory of a witness do not call into question “the validity
of her whole testimony,” rather, that testimony re-presents the “mean-
ingful truth” of the event (1992b, 60–63). In this model, memory does
not function as a photographic image or reproduction of reality. Instead,
it captures the experience of the event, which the Prosecutor (like the
psychoanalyst) listens to. The Prosecutor listens for the truthful account
of the legal wrong as factual event.




Similarly to the other models deployed in Furundzija, the Trial Chamber
does not use a model of memory that understands it as the replication of
“reality.” For example, it accepts that inconsistency in testimony is only
relevant where it is “sufficient to render the material aspects of the evidence
of witness A unreliable” (F 341). Rather, it utilizes all three elements of
testimony, mental state, and meaningfulness to understand memory as
the re-presentation of the event. The Trial Chamber unites these three
elements in an evidential model of memory. Memory is the re-presentation
of an event, which the Chamber assesses “[h]aving seen and heard all the
witnesses and considered the evidence” (F 341). The Chamber first es-
tablishes itself as the arbiter of memory using the evidence of an expert
witness—“I know of no way of measuring what people actually remem-
ber”—to establish that science cannot offer the law definitive answers on
the nature of memory (F 341). Rather, the Chamber looks to its own
judgment of the witnesses and other evidence to assess memory. In effect,
the Chamber assesses the accuracy of the re-presentation of the event in
memory.
To make that assessment, the Trial Chamber deploys notions of reli-
ability, or the accuracy of the witness’s memory, and credibility, or the
perceived truthfulness of the witness.26 The Chamber looks to the material,
internal consistency of the testimony of the complainant. While under the
Tribunal’s Statute there is no legal requirement of corroboration, the Trial
Chamber also looks to other testimony and evidence to confirm the ve-
racity of memory. For example, it accepted the testimony of Witness A
because she was reliable and credible in her “honest and confident” pre-
sentation of her memory, and her testimony was coherent and
corroborated (F 342–43). This is an evidential assessment of the re-
presentation of the event in memory.
The Trial Chamber utilizes a model of evidential memory, of memory
as the re-presentation of an event that is proved or disproved. In this
sense, it is an empiricist model of memory that relies on a “cognitivist,
empirical epistemology” (Jackson and Doran 1996, 173). Proof of mem-
ory is probabilistic and fallibilistic. Memory re-represents the event, which
the Trial Chamber judges in terms of the “reliability and credibility of the
26 “Credibility depends upon whether the witness should be believed. Reliability depends
upon whether the evidence, if accepted, proves the fact to which it is directed”: Prosecutor
v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Raomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, case no. IT-96-23-T and no. IT-
96-23-1T, Decision on Motion for Acquittal, Trial Chamber II, July 3, 2000, par. 7.
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evidence.”27 The Trial Chamber judges whether the memory of an event
is a legal fact according to these models of evidence. This argument does
not claim that the Trial Chamber’s judgment on memory negates the
“reality” of the event or that its judgment is not a powerful representation
of “truth.” However, it does contend that the concepts of accuracy, truth-
fulness, evidence, and fact that the Chamber uses to assess memory are
themselves constituted and constitutive. This constitutive dimension of
judgment on memory is itself recognized by the court, both in terms of
the legal principles and rules that govern evidence (such as Section 3 of
the Rules) and in terms of a right to appeal (such as Article 25 of the
Statute). Further, the judgment of proof or disproof of the memory of a
wrong is according to a legal standard of evidence, namely, beyond rea-
sonable doubt.
In sexual assault cases, the court fundamentally assesses that proof in
relation to the complainant as witness. In particular, it assesses the tes-
timony of the complainant in relation to her reliability and credibility. For
this reason, the Trial Chamber accepts that the psychological state of the
witness is relevant to the issue of reliability, and this issue becomes central
to the trial. The complainant’s testimony is also assessed in relation to
other witnesses and evidential material, namely, corroboration. The court
of law thus constitutes legal memory through these notions of credibility,
reliability, and corroboration. These concepts do not represent “objective”
criteria of judgment. Rather, they are conceptual models of testimonial
evidence that ground the legal recognition of the complainant’s memory
of the wrong as legal fact. In this way, the Trial Chamber’s arbitration on
memory constructs legal memory itself.
Gendered memory
The evidential model of memory constitutes legal memory as gendered
memory. First, this model relies on the trial process to assess the “truth”
of memory. That assessment deploys the evidential model’s concept of
memory as evidence. Second, the evidential model founds itself on a
conception of the relationship between memory and the complainant as
witness. These constructions of legal memory are not sexually neutral.
Rather, they constitute legal memory in an integral relationship to gender.
In the trial process, the complainant makes the claim of a wrong. Her
memory materializes the wrong because it both articulates the wrong and
27 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, case no. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment of July 21, 2000, Appeals
Chamber, par. 37.
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evidences it. In the trial, it will be her testimony, above all others, that is
called into question. It will be her memory that will be most stringently
judged according to notions of reliability, credibility, consistency, and cor-
roboration. It will be her witnessing that will be most subjected to an
“evidential” assessment of its re-presentation of the event.
The evidential model of memory requires proof of the complainant’s
memory of the wrong. If memory is evidence, it must also be evidenced.
In the courtroom, memory is both truth and falsehood. In memory against
memory, there must be another ground of adjudication. Because of the
legal model of memory, the issue of evidential corroboration of memory
returns. It could be suggested that this is the reason why, in Furundzija,
the Tribunal comments: “although her testimony, in accordance with Rule
96 of the Rules, requires no corroboration, the Trial Chamber notes that
the evidence of Witness D does confirm the evidence of Witness A in this
regard” (F 343). As a matter of law, the testimony of the complainant
does not require corroboration.28 As a matter of evidence, its proof entails
corroborative confirmation of further evidence. In this sense, the memory
of the complainant of the wrong does not adequately evidence the wrong.
The complainant is thus subject to an unequal assessment of her memory
of the injurious wrong.
If one ground of judgment on the memory of the complainant is
corroboration, another is credibility. For example, the Amicus Curiae Brief
points out that the issue of psychological and neurological credibility was
only raised in relation to Witness A and to no other witness: “defence
counsel has sought to impeach only Witness A on the basis of her cred-
ibility in relation to her medical, psychological and psychiatric treatment
and counselling records.”29 The Defense did not seek to discredit another
prosecution witness on these grounds, despite his evidence that he had
received psychiatric treatment. Nor was this line of argument pursued in
relation to the Accused, who like other combatants could well have been
expected to suffer PTSD himself. Furundzija is the first trial at which this
issue was raised, despite the likelihood that “many, if not all, victims
appearing before this Tribunal have suffered severe trauma and, therefore,
may also be suffering from PTSD.”30 The issue here is not whether PTSD
impacts on the reliability of memory. Rather, the issue concerns the de-
28 Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, case no. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment of March 24, 2000,
Appeals Chamber, paras. 62–63. See also May and Wierda 2001 for a discussion of the
principles and rules of evidence of the Tribunal.
29 Amicus Curiae Brief, par. 23.
30 Ibid.
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ployment of a diagnosis of PTSD as a means of discrediting the witness
only in relation to Witness A as the complainant in a sexual assault case.
As the Furundzija case reveals, the testimony of the complainant will be
subjected to unequal testing because of the structure of the legal testing
of her memory.
This unequal testing of the complainant founds itself on a predication
of a relationship between memory and the complainant as witness. In
cases of sexual assault, issues of reliability and credibility “are focused on
very strongly” (Brown, Burman, and Jamieson 1993, 21). In such cases,
the court subjects the reliability and credibility of the complainant to
greater scrutiny, and the distinction between these two evidential issues
is not maintained. For example, in Furundzija the distinction between
reliability and credibility is not maintained in relation to Witness A. Rather,
the accuracy of the memory, its reliability, becomes predicated on the
credibility of the complainant. This model of memory presumes that there
is a relationship between the reliability of memory and the credibility of
the complainant. For this reason, in Furundzija it becomes legitimate to
call the reliability of the memory of the complainant into question by
calling her credibility into question. Issues of reliability—the “accuracy”
of memory—thus devolve into issues of credibility—the “trustworthiness”
of the witness. The credibility of the complainant thus becomes an essential
part of the assessment of her memory. Credibility is figured as the ground
of memory and so the truth of memory becomes linked to the truth of
the person of the witness.
However, the legal “witness” is a gendered subject. It is gendered be-
cause it is more likely that women will suffer sexual assault than men
(Thomas and Ralph 1999, 205). It is also gendered because notions of
sexual difference underlie the legal conception of the complainant as wit-
ness. The sexual assault trial turns, like no other, on the question of the
embodied ontological status of the witness, that is, the capacity of the
complainant to be a witness. As the Amicus Curiae Brief emphasizes, in
the trial process, “the competence of witnesses to testify is normally pre-
sumed and challenges to the reliability of evidence on the basis of psy-
chiatric condition of the witness rarely form part of the trial process. Unless
we are to resurrect, consciously or unconsciously, the myth that com-
plainants are inherently more untrustworthy than witnesses at any other
trial.”31
This myth of the inherently uncreditworthy complainant whose mem-
ory cannot be trusted reappears in Furundzija. The female complainant
31 Amicus Curiae Brief, par. 31.
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is considered “less credible than victims of other crimes . . . the depiction
of the woman complainer as ‘incredible’ and untrustworthy has a long
history in law” (Raitt and Zeedyk 2000, 43). Untrustworthy because she
is a “feminine” witness, she is perceived to be inherently subjective, ir-
rational, passive, and emotional (Raitt and Zeedyk 2000, 43).32 If the
“whole rape trial is a process of disqualification (of women),” this process
begins with the assumption that the complainant is not a truthful witness
(Smart 1989, 35).
Notions of sexual difference found this ontological conception of the
witness. This model of the relationship between memory and the witness
entails that the complainant cannot simply be a neutral third party giving
evidence on behalf of the prosecutor. Rather, she will be assessed as a
witness in terms of an ontological conception of the “nature” of sexed
subjectivity. Because of this conception of the sexed identity of the witness,
the credibility of the complainant is not presumed; rather, she must es-
tablish that credibility. It thereby imposes a higher standard of proof of
reliable memory on a complainant in sexual assault cases because of the
assumption of inherent uncreditworthiness.33
This ontological and gendered conception of the witness reemerges in
arguments concerning the relationship between the psychological or neu-
rological state of the witness and the reliability of her memory. In their
discussion of “rape trauma syndrome,” considered to be a subcategory of
PTSD, Fiona Raitt and Suzanne Zeedyk argue that “a diagnosis of this
sort renders it more possible for defence lawyers to attack the reliability
of a woman victim’s credibility on the ground that she is suffering from
a mental illness” (2000, 103). By allowing the issue of reliability to be
linked to that of psychological state (credibility), the Trial Chamber al-
lowed this defense argument to be made. Further, in Furundzija, the Trial
Chamber accepted the contention that there was a link between the psy-
chological state and the credibility of the complainant. This link took two
forms: first, between her past psychiatric history and her “truthfulness,”
and second, between her current psychiatric state of PTSD and the reli-
ability of her memory. The Trial Chamber did not accept that a diagnosis
of PTSD entailed unreliability of memory. Nevertheless, it allowed a nexus
between the psychological state of the witness and her credibility to be
32 Such is the logic of corroboration requirements and the admission of sexual character
evidence in domestic jurisdictions. For example, in her study of English rape trials, Sue Lees
found that “the unreliability of the woman’s word compared to the supposed rationality of
men is a bias that judges express quite blatantly” (1997, 68).
33 Amicus Curiae Brief, par. 21.
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made, thereby linking the credibility of the witness to the reliability of
her memory.
This nexus relies on an assumption that there is a relationship between
bodily and psychic integrity and the integrity of memory. A conception
of the witness as a “masculine” subject underpins this model of bodily
and psychic integrity. Kaja Silverman describes the normative masculine
subject as projecting an “unimpaired masculinity” of coherent identity
and bodily integrity (1992, 42). For the masculine subject, the “coherence
and ideality of the corporeal ego” rests on “an unimpaired bodily ‘en-
velope’” (Silverman 1996, 25; see also Silverman 1992, 61). Coherence
of the masculine self rests on the integrity of its body. The model of the
witness that possesses a coherent identity and a bodily integrity rests on
a model of masculine subjectivity. However, if the masculine subject sup-
poses its corporeal and subjective coherence, the “feminine” subject is
imagined to suffer the lack or loss he does not. “The feminine” thus
“represents the site at which the male subject deposits his lack” (1992,
46). For this reason, the position of the “feminine” witness is that of a
subject that lacks bodily integrity and therefore stable identity.
The victim of sexual assault testifies to the rupture of psychic and bodily
integrity. In articulating the wrong of sexual assault, the witness must
testify to a trauma to bodily and subjective unity. In this position, the
sexual assault victim becomes a “feminine” witness. Adler argues that the
rape victim “occupies a unique position in the legal system which treats
her with unparalleled suspicion” (Brown, Burman, and Jamieson 1993,
17). This “unique position” arises in part because the victim of sexual
assault is placed in the position of the feminine witness and hence of an
inherently untrustworthy witness. Both male and female victims of sexual
assault may occupy that position. Indeed, as Sue Lees points out, the male
victim of rape is often perceived as being “feminized” by the assault itself
(1997, 106).34 To testify to a breach of self and corporeal integrity places
the witness in a “feminine” position of subjective and bodily lack and,
therefore, in the position of the “feminine” witness whose credibility is
in doubt.
The “unique position” of the complainant also arises because of the
relationship between the legal conception of the witness as subject and
the nature of sexual assault itself. The model of the masculine witness
assumes that there is a relationship between bodily and psychic integrity.
34 Kaja Silverman reminds us that Freud believed that the traumatized soldier, like the
feminine hysteric, suffered from reminiscence. For Silverman, the traumatized soldier is in
effect in the position of the feminine subject (1992, 56).
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A breach of bodily integrity consequently also ruptures psychic integrity.
The witness who testifies to sexual assault thus becomes subject to a
presumption of uncreditworthiness. That model further assumes that there
is a relationship between bodily and psychic integrity and the integrity of
memory. Accordingly, a breach of bodily integrity entails a rupture of the
integrity of memory. In this way, the witness who testifies to sexual assault
also becomes subject to a presumption of unreliability of memory. This
model presumes that the trauma of sexual assault entails an injury to
coherent and integrated memory. These presumptions can be seen in the
legal myth that “women and child victims of sexual violence are uniquely
prone to lie, are susceptible to suggestion by others, and to hysteria and
emotional upheavals which substantially call into question their credibility
as witnesses.”35 In Furundzija, the argument by the Defense that the
trauma of Witness A’s experience of rape produced a neurological trauma,
which literally writes bodily damage on the brain and hence on memory,
is a “scientific” rendering of these presumptions.
All parties to the hearing with the exception of Witness A restate these
presumptions. In the trial hearing, the parties did not contest the traumatic
nature of the sexual assaults on Witness A or the diagnosis of PTSD as a
consequence of that trauma. What was contested was the relationship
between that psychological trauma and the subsequent reliability of mem-
ory: “whether the reliability of the evidence of Witness A has or may have
been affected by any psychological disorder from which she may have
suffered as a result of her ordeal” (F 339). The Trial Chamber accepted
the testimony of Witness A because of her “honest and confident” pre-
sentation of her memory and her coherent account of the events (F 342).
She was able to demonstrate that the trauma to her body and her person
did not entail a trauma to her memory. Paradoxically, she was able to
meet the higher standard of credibility because her trauma did not appear
to have a material effect on the coherence and integrity of her memory.
The paradoxical position of the complainant derives from the fact that
she must demonstrate the breach to her bodily integrity, while also dem-
onstrating that her “self” and hence her memory remain “intact.” Her
testimony must attest to the harm of the assault on the integrity of her
“self” while also establishing that her “self” is coherent and stable.
The production of memory by the law is not sexually indifferent.
Rather, it constitutes legal memory in a relation to sexual difference. The
legal memory of the complainant is a gendered memory because of the
structure of the trial process, the evidential model of memory, her sexed
35 Amicus Curiae Brief, par. 16.
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subjectivity, and the sexed position of the witness testifying to sexual
assault.
Legal memory and justice
The judgment of the court is an adjudication on memory, which figures
individual memory as public memory. However, the memory of the com-
plainant is also the testimony of the witness to the wrong, and as such,
it is also an address to the law to give justice. Agamben argues that “law
is solely directed to judgment, independent of truth and justice” (2000,
18). He rightly contends that we must not mistake the juridical for the
ethical. However, if law produces legal memory and judgment is contin-
gent on the legal memory of the wrong, then we must demand justice
of the law. In order to have an ethics of judgment, we must also have an
ethics of legal memory. An ethics of legal memory recognizes the claim
of the complainant on the law and hence its responsibility to her.
This ethics first requires the deconstruction of sexual difference as the
ground of judgment. The Furundzija case reveals the formation of jus-
ticiable, procedural, and evidential memory as gendered memory. It il-
luminates sexual difference as the ontological ground of legal memory in
the prosecution of sexual assault as a war crime. However, if judgment is
contingent on sexual difference, an ethics of legal memory does not entail
a refusal of sexual difference before the law. For example, feminists insist
international law must recognize specific gendered harms, such as sexual
assault, as war crimes. Instead, it requires a political critique of the juridical
constitution of legal memory in relationship to sexual difference.
Furundzija also reveals the possibility of a reconstructive ethics of legal
memory. As an authoritative judgment affirming sexual assault as a war
crime in substantive international humanitarian law, it demonstrates an
important shift in the notion of sexual assault as a justiciable wrong in
international law. As the first case of the prosecution of sexual assault as
a war crime, it shows important changes in the prosecutorial and pro-
cedural practices of this area. For example, it reflects the Tribunal’s in-
tention to prosecute such crimes and its recognition of feminist arguments
concerning consent and corroboration in relation to sexual assault in the
drafting of Rule 96 of the Rules of the Tribunal. However, Furundzija
also indicates the necessity of the law recognizing its ethical responsibility
to the complainant in its judgment on the memory of sexual assault as a
legal wrong. In particular, that responsibility requires reconfiguring the
gendered constitution of legal memory in the structure of the trial process,
the evidential model of memory, and the ontological and sexed conception
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of the crime of sexual assault and of the complainant as witness. This
difficult and necessary reconstructive moment of an ethics of memory
requires a radical refiguring of legal memory. The models of memory in
Furundzija do not offer a ready template for this refiguring. What it
requires are new models of legal memory itself. The Furundzija case
reveals the contingency of the justice of memory. By undertaking an ethics
of legal memory, it is possible to begin to answer the address of memory
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